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This paper presents information on labor market participation of the elderly, mortality and health,
pathways to retirement and rates of participation in various earnings replacing programs in the Netherlands.
It presents an overview of reforms to Disability Insurance (DI) and other income maintenance and
early retirement programs over the past few decades, and examines to what extent these reforms have
affected labor market exit routes of older workers. The overall picture that emerges is that DI receipt
appears unrelated to the general health of the population and that over the last two decades relatively
fewer older workers exit the labor market through DI. This reduction may, arguably, in part be attributed
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This paper presents information on labor market participation of the elderly, mortality and 
health,  pathways  to  retirement  and  rates  of  participation  in  various  earnings  replacing 
programs in the Netherlands. It presents an overview of reforms to Disability Insurance (DI) 
and other income maintenance and early retirement programs over the past few decades, and 
examines  to  what  extent  these  reforms  have  affected  labor  market  exit  routes  of  older 
workers. The overall picture that emerges is that DI receipt appears unrelated to the general 
health of the population and that over the last two decades relatively fewer older workers exit 
the labor market through DI. This reduction may, arguably, in part be attributed to stricter DI 




1.  Introduction 
Earlier research suggests that the low participation rate of persons well below the statutory 
retirement  age  of  65  in  the  Netherlands  can,  at  least  in  part,  be  attributed  to  generous 
incentives to retire (cf. Kapteyn and de Vos, 1999). Until recently, the incentive to retire early 
was particularly strong if the employer offered an Early Retirement (ER) scheme, but an 
alternative  route  to  retire  via  Disability  Insurance  (DI)  was  also  quite  attractive.  A  less 
attractive route to retire for workers is via Unemployment Insurance (UI) or Social Assistance 
(SA). The attractiveness of DI and its relatively easy access for elderly workers can be seen as 
significant contributing factors for the high prevalence of DI receipt in the Netherlands, as 
compared to most other developed countries. There is a large body of research showing that a 
considerable part of the DI recipients in the Netherlands are not really (totally) unfit to work 
(cf. Aarts en de Jong, 1992). De Gier et al. (2002) conclude however that most of the results 
of this research have hardly affected DI policy making.   
 
In this paper we  aim to contribute to the knowledge on the  relationship between DI  and 
retirement by focusing on two questions. The first question is whether, next to or instead of 
the  strong  incentives  to  retire  via  DI,  we  can  find  indications  that  trends  in  health  and 
mortality actually played a role in the increase of the numbers of DI recipients until the early 
1990s  and  their  decrease  since  then.  To  that  end  we  will  present  various  graphs  relating 
health, mortality, DI receipt and labor market participation. 
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The second question concerns the effect of reforms on DI and other income maintenance and 
early retirement programs on the number of older workers exiting the labor market and the 
pathways chosen to exit and effectively retire. To assess possible effects of reforms we will 
present graphs which show the dates of various reforms in combination with the trends in the 
pathways to retirement. In addition we will estimate a model in which the reforms to DI and 
other  programs  are  included  as  explanatory  variables  for  changes  in  the  pathways  to 
retirement. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains a brief overview of DI and other programs, 
and a chronological overview of reforms during the past four decades. Section 3 presents 
graphs on health, mortality, DI and labor force participation. Section 4 presents graphs on the 
pathways to retirement. Because the data on pathways only cover a limited period, section 5 
presents a number of additional graphs covering a longer period. Section 6 aims to quantify 
the effects of reforms on the pathways to retirement. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2.   Disability Insurance and other Social Security programs and reforms 
Disability Insurance (DI) 
 
Introduced  in  1967,  the  Dutch  Disability  Insurance  (WAO,  Wet  op  de  Arbeids-
ongeschiktheidsverzekering) aimed to insure employees against loss of earnings as a result of 
long-term inability to work as a result of illness or incapacity. If after having been ill for a 
period of one  year, the employee could not resume work, he/she would be entitled to an 
earnings  related  DI  benefit  which  could  last  until  the  employee  reached  the  statutory 
retirement age of 65.  
 
Starting  in  the  1970s,  the  numbers  of  individuals  on  DI  in  the  Netherlands  showed  a 
continuous increase until the 1990s. These numbers were much higher than expected when 
the new DI legislation was introduced and much higher than might be expected given the 
average health status of the population. In fact, in the mid 1970s when unemployment was 
rising  dramatically,  the  route  to  DI  was  generally  used  by  employers  as  a  path  of  least 
resistance  to  shed  superfluous  employees.  For  the  employee  DI  was  both  socially  more 
acceptable and more attractive than UI, in particular because the benefit could be received 




With  the  increase  in  the  number  of  benefit  recipients,  expenditures  on  DI  started  to  rise 
dramatically, and since the start of the 1980s government policy has sought to reverse the 
trend of the ever increasing DI expenditures by various reforms to limit access to DI, increase 
the number of persons exiting DI and lower the average DI benefit (see table 1).  
 
In 1985, the replacement rate of DI was lowered from 80 to 70%, in the wake of the recession 
of the early 1980s. This affected both new entrants to DI and ‘existing cases’. In 1987, access 
to the full DI was limited for partially disabled unemployed new entrants. In the early 1990s 
again government saw the need to do something about the high numbers of DI recipients and 
this resulted in a series of measures: the duration of the full DI benefit was limited for new 
entrants younger than 50, stricter disability criteria were introduced for entry into DI and 
younger DI recipients were to be retested. For individuals younger than 45, the new disability   3
criteria were to be used, and for persons between 45 and 50, retesting was to be done on the 
basis  of  the  old  disability  criteria.  Mainly  because  most  employees  took  out  a  private 
insurance to compensate for the shorter duration of the full DI benefit for younger persons, DI 
remained an attractive option. Next to limiting the access and the generosity of the benefit, 
policies were also introduced to shift the costs to firms with high numbers of employees 
exiting to DI. First, the costs of sickness benefits were charged directly to the employer for 
two to six weeks (1994), and later on for a full year preceding the exit to DI. Second, in 1998 
experience  rating  was  introduced:  for  large  firms  in  particular,  the  DI  contributions  were 
partly based on the DI record of the firm in question. A high exit rate into DI resulted in 
higher contributions. 
 
Because  all  these  reforms  did  not  succeed  in  substantially  reducing  the  numbers  of  DI 
recipients, by 2002 the feeling was that enough was enough and the time had come for a more 
radical approach. As from 2002, during the year of sickness preceding exit to DI, employer 
and employee are jointly responsible for taking sufficient action for reintegration into the 
workforce.  Moreover,  this  sickness  period  can  be  extended  if  insufficient  reintegration 
measures have been taken. As from 2004, exit to DI only happens after two years of sickness, 
during which time the employer pays sickness benefits. As from 2006, the new DI law, (WIA, 
Wet werk en inkomen naar arbeidsvermogen) makes a strict distinction between fully and 
permanently disabled and partially or temporarily disabled. The former receive a generous 
75%  of  their  previous  earnings  until  age  65  (IVA,  Inkomensvoorziening  Volledig 
Arbeidsongeschikten).  The  latter  receive  a  less  generous  benefit  (WGA,  regeling 
Werkhervatting Gedeeltelijk Arbeidsongeschikten) which depends on the previous earnings, 
the number of weeks worked before, and the current earnings (if any) and the percentage of 
previous earnings which the employee is deemed to be capable of earning. Furthermore, once 
again a retest operation is set up for existing DI beneficiaries younger than 50 (whose DI 
remains unchanged). 
 
All in all, despite the decreased generosity of the benefit, for a long time DI remained an 
attractive route to exit the labor force, and whilst the levels of DI expenditures as a percentage 
of GDP have been decreasing considerably since the early 1980s, the number of DI recipients 
peaked much later, in the mid 1990s. Only the most recent series of major reforms, starting in 




As mentioned above, DI benefits end when the recipient turns 65. More in general, the Dutch 
benefit system is characterized by a clear distinction between benefits for persons younger 
than 65 and benefits for persons aged 65 or above. The latter receive the flat rate state pension 
(SP),  in  most  cases  supplemented  by  an  occupational  pension  (PP).  The  former  may  be 
entitled  to  Disability  Insurance  (DI),  Unemployment  Insurance  (UI),  means-tested  Social 
Assistance (SA), or, when having retired before age 65 from a firm offering an occupational 
pension plan, an Early Retirement benefit (ER). 
 
ER  was  introduced  in  most  sectors  during  the  1970s,  mainly  in  reaction  to  rising 
unemployment (cf. Kapteyn et al. 2010), and at least until the end of the 1990s in most cases 
consisted of an offer too good to refuse. In particular, workers retiring later than the earliest 
possible ER date were not compensated by higher benefits or lower taxes, so that in fact they 
faced an implicit tax rate of more than 100% (cf. Kapteyn and De Vos, 1999). 
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For workers approaching 60 who were not entitled to ER (e.g. because of an insufficiently 
long employment history or because they worked in a firm which did not offer ER) and who 
could not plausibly be retired via DI, Unemployment Insurance (UI) offered a third pathway 
to retirement before the statutory retirement age of 65. In most cases, it offered a replacement 
rate of 70%, and furthermore, until recently, no obligation to search for employment after the 
age of 57.5.  
 
Upon reaching the age of 65, all residents are entitled to the flat rate state pension (AOW) 
which  is  financed  by  a  pay  as  you  go  social  insurance  contribution.  Moreover,  most 
employees accumulate fully funded occupational pension rights and supplement their state 
pension to (ideally) 70% of previous earnings. 
 
Notably, traditionally in the Netherlands substantial numbers of women used to leave the 
labor market (long) before age 65 without an earnings replacing benefit. In recent decades, 
labor  market  participation  of  older  women  has  increased  rapidly,  and  this  pathway  to 
retirement has become less common. 
 
Reforms to other programs 
 
The prospect of exploding costs once the large baby boom cohorts start to reach the ER age 
turned out to be sufficiently threatening for effective reforms to be put in place by the end of 
the 1990s. In most cases a cost reduction as a result of reducing the effective ER entitlement 
was combined with the introduction of a more or less actuarially fair system. As a result the 
employee could still opt for retiring early, but with a reduced pension, or later, but with an 
increased pension. By 2006, the government dealt a final blow to the old ER systems by 
effectively terminating the tax exemption for ER contributions that would enable a retirement 
age lower than 65. Only systems offering a replacement rate of at most 70% at the pension 
age of 65,  and actuarially fair reductions when an earlier pension  age  is chosen can still 
collect tax exempt contributions. This reform does not affect workers who are already close to 
65 and have accumulated more generous entitlements.  
The Dutch Unemployment Insurance (UI) system saw a major reform in 1987, affecting both 
eligibility and benefit period. However, since 1984, workers aged 57.5 or older could receive 
UI until the state pension age of 65 and this did not change in 1987. As of 2004, persons aged 
57.5 or older receiving UI are no longer exempt from the requirement to seek work. In other 
words, they are no longer ‘automatically’ receiving UI until age 65 but have to try to find 
work and, in theory,  accept a job offer. Moreover, as of October 1, 2006, the maximum 
duration of UI is 38 months. After that period all that is left is a means tested entitlement to 
Social Assistance (SA) with a benefit equal to the net minimum wage. 
 
By and large, since 1974, for most single individuals and couples older than 65, changes in 
the flat rate state pension are indexed by changes in the after tax minimum wage. Revisions 
include the introduction of an independent pension entitlement for married women in 1985, 
and the entitlement of supplementary state pension for persons with a spouse younger than 65 
(1987, revised 1994). A proposed legislation to increase the statutory pension age by two 
years (to 67) by 2025 is still in discussion.  
 
In addition to the universal right of a state pension from the age of 65 onwards, an increasing 
number of persons reaching the age of 65 (approximately 96% of men and 67% of women in 
2007. See Knoef, Alessie, and Kalwij, 2010) have been accumulating supplementary defined 
benefit occupational pension rights (PP). However, since the early 2000s, the generosity of   5
these occupational pensions has gradually been reduced, because most of the pension funds 
have shifted from calculating the pension on the basis of final earnings to calculations based 
on average earnings. Moreover, in general the indexation of the benefits, which used to be 
based on the wage index, has become less generous following the successive crises on the 
stock market, affecting the investments of pension funds. Recently proposed pension reforms 
aimed at ensuring a sustainable Dutch pension system are still in discussion (cf. Stichting van 
de Arbeid, 2010).  
 
 




3.  Historical data : Mortality, health measures, Labor Force Participation (LFP) 
and Disability Insurance (DI) 
In this section we address the first question formulated in the introduction on whether we can 
find indications that trends in health actually played a role in the increase of the numbers of 
DI recipients until the early 1990s and their decrease since then. For this purpose we present 
statistics on labor force participation, the use of DI, self-reported health and mortality rates of 
the population. These statistics point to the conclusion that there is not much of a relationship 




We present three types of figures on mortality. Figures 1 (men) and 2 (women) take the 
mortality rates at age 60 and 65 of 1960 as their starting point and show the ages with the 
same mortality rate in the period up to 2008. For men, the age of equal mortality was actually 
lower than in 1960 until the early 1980s. From 1970 it shows an increase of more than 7 years 
up to 2008. For women, unlike for men, the age of equal mortality did not show a clear 
decrease in the 1960s. However, on balance, the increase up to 2008 was only marginally 
larger than that of men. 
 
<Figures 1 and 2 about here> 
 
Consistent with the findings in figures 1 and 2, Figure 3 shows that both sexes saw their two-
year mortality rates decline between 1960 and 2007, especially at higher ages. The decrease 
of the mortality rate for older women was substantially larger than that of men. 
 
<Figure 3 about here> 
 
Figures 4 and 5 show the time paths of mortality rates for men and women ages 55, 60 and 65 
respectively. They confirm that for men, mortality in 1980 was about equal to mortality in 
1960,  but  it  also  shows  a  clear  decrease  between  1970  and  2008.  Women  show  a  more 
uniform decline, starting from much lower levels.  
 
< Figures 4 and 5 about here > 
 
Mortality and Health 
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None of the figures on mortality would lead one to suspect that starting in the 1970s, the 
Netherlands saw an unprecedented increase in the numbers of disability benefit recipients, 
and that in fact, until recently, the Netherlands had one of the highest levels of DI receipt in 
the  world.  Conceivably,  however,  the  introduction  of  a  generous  DI  system  may  have 
contributed to the marked fall in male mortality during this period. Apart from mortality, not 
many health statistics can be found that can be used to track health over time. One of the few 
health statistics that is more or less comparable over a fairly long period of time is the series 
of self-reported good health collected by the OECD, available from 1983 until 2008. For both 
men and women aged 45-64, this statistic shows a somewhat erratic pattern (figures 6 and 7). 
For men we observe on balance an increase in the percentage reporting good health or better 
between 1983 and 1995 and, with a few exceptions, a fairly stable rate (of about 75%) since 
then. For women, there is even less of a trend and in most years, the percentage of women 
reporting a good health or better hovers around 70%.  
 
<Figure 6 and 7 about here > 
 
LFP and DI vs. Mortality  
 
It appears from figures 6 and 7 that self-reported health and mortality do not show a clear 
(negative)  correlation.  However,  neither  self-reported  health  nor  mortality  show  a  clear 
relation  with  DI  prevalence  or  labor  force  participation  either.  As  an  example,  we  show 
employment and disability for men aged 60-64 in one figure with mortality at age 60 and 65 
(Figure 8), from 1981 until 2007. For women we present the same information in Figure 9. 
 
< Figure 8 and 9 about here > 
 
For men, the continuous decrease in the mortality rates has been accompanied by decreasing 
employment  and  increasing  disability  prevalence  during  the  first  part  of  the  period  and 
increasing  employment  and  decreasing  disability  since  approximately  1995.  For  women, 
decreasing  mortality  rates  accompany  more  or  less  stable  employment  and  somewhat 
increasing DI during the first half of the period and rapidly increasing employment and stable 
DI prevalence during the second half of the period. It is hard to interpret these patterns just 
based on health trends. During the first part of the period, one could argue that the increase in 
DI receipt has contributed to longer lives, by allowing workers an escape from jobs that are 
detrimental to health. During the second part of the period however we see that both mortality 
and  DI  receipt  are  falling,  so  then  we  would  have  to  assume  that  causality  has  changed 
direction and that a healthier population (at least for the male population) has less need to 
apply for DI benefits. Altogether it seems more plausible that the changes in DI receipt are 
largely the result of the various reforms discussed before. It is to the effects of these reforms 
that we now turn. 
 
4.  Pathways to retirement and program reforms 
In this section we address the second question formulated in the introduction and assess to 
what  extent  reforms  in  Disability  Insurance  and  other  income  maintenance  and  early 
retirement programs have affected the pathways to retirement and the labor force participation 
of the population approaching the retirement age. Detailed data on the pathways to retirement 
are only available for a relatively short period (1989-2007). Therefore, we will also present 
some results that do not depend on the availability of pathways data (section 5). The focus of   7
the present section is the information on the pathways to retirement from the Income Panel 
Survey, which we first briefly describe below. 
 
IPO Data 
The data are taken from the 1981, 1985, 1989–2007 Income Panel Study of the Netherlands 
(IPO, Inkomens Panel Onderzoek, CBS 2009) gathered by Statistics Netherlands. The IPO, a 
representative sample of the Dutch population, consists of an administrative panel dataset of, 
on average, about 95,000 individuals per year. Sampling is based on individuals’ national 
security numbers, and the selected individuals are followed for as long as they are residing in 
the Netherlands on December 31 of the sample year. The dataset includes individuals living in 
institutions for the elderly, such as nursing homes. Individuals born in the Netherlands enter 
the panel for the first time in the year of their birth and immigrants to the Netherlands in the 
year  of  their  arrival.  An  individual  only  exits the  panel  by  death  or  emigration  from  the 
Netherlands. The IPO contains data on the demographic characteristics, income and labor 
market status for each member of a selected individual’s household.  
 
IPO definitions of labor market states  
The IPO income data are based primarily on records from the tax office and institutions that 
pay out (insurance) benefits, and contain detailed information on all income components at an 
individual  level.  Based  on  the  largest  income  component  Statistics  Netherlands  assigns  a 
labor market status to an individual. An individual can be (self-) employed, unemployed (UI, 
receives unemployment insurance or social assistance benefits), on disability (DI, receives 
disability  or  (long-term)  sickness  insurance  benefits),
1  early  retired  (ER,  when  receiving 





We start with two figures presenting the employment rates (including self-employment) for 
men and women in three age groups (50-54, 55-59 and 60-64). Notably, the employment rate 
of older persons (65+) can be assumed to be fairly negligible in the Netherlands.  
 
< Figures 10 and 11 about here > 
 
Figure 10 illustrates the dramatic decline in the employment rate of older men as well as the 
reversal of this trend starting about 1995. The pattern is particularly striking in the age group 
60-64, where the employment rate dropped from almost 60% in 1981 to less than 25% in 
1994, and then picked up to more than 40% by 2007. For women, on the other hand, we 
hardly observe decreasing employment rates. On the contrary, in the group of women aged 
50-54 the employment rate has been increasing since 1985 and the older age groups followed 
this trend some years later. Notably, at the end of the observation period, in all three age 
groups the employment rate is still substantially below the figure for men. 
 
Since there has been a more or less continuous series of Social Security reforms in the various 
programs since 1993 it is hard to assess whether some of the changes in employment may be 
attributed to particular reforms. It can be assumed that at least part of the increase in the 
employment rate of older men would not have been observed if the implicit incentives to 
                                                 
1 The disability insurance scheme is referred to as WAO or WIA and the (long-term) sickness insurance scheme 
as ZW (see www.uwv.nl). Data limitations prevent a more refined classification. For instance, if an individual is 
partially disabled and the main source of income is from employment, this individual is classified as employed.    8
enter the respective retirement programs (ER, DI, UI) would have remained as generous as 
they  were  in  the  early  1990s.  Cohort  effects  underlie  large  parts  of  the  increases  in  the 
employment rates for women. However, here we can also assume that the employment rate 
would have been lower if access to DI, ER and UI would not have been made more difficult 
and financially less attractive. 
 
Pathways to retirement 
 
Did the reforms affect the pathways to retirement? Undoubtedly, they did. However, it is 
difficult  to  distinguish  the  effects  of  reforms  from  other  factors  causing  variation  in  the 
pathways.  Moreover,  even  if  the  pathways  remain  stable,  reforms  may  have  effects  on 
retirement (If, e.g., everyone chooses to retire one year later, the distribution across pathways 
may remain unchanged). Figures 12 and 13 show the pathways to retirement of men and 
women aged 50 to 64 between 1989 and 2006. A pathway is a particular exit route from 
employment between two subsequent years. For example, figure 12 shows that about 20% of 
the male workers aged 50-64 in 1989 who leave the labor market that year are on DI in 1990. 
 
< Figures 12 and 13 about here > 
 
Looking at these figures, we see that the pattern is fairly stable given the many reforms to DI 
and  other  Social  Security  programs  during  this  period.  Nevertheless  some  trends  can  be 
observed. Over this period DI becomes a relatively less frequently used pathway to retirement 
for both men and women, in particular from the late 1990s onwards. For men, ER is the 
dominant route to retirement throughout the whole period. The year with the lowest share of 
ER (and the highest share of unemployment) is 1993, a year with low economic growth and 
rapidly increasing unemployment. For women, leaving the labor market without own source 
of replacement income (‘Other’) and relying on the income/pension of the spouse
2 remains a 
popular pathway to retirement but has been overtaken by ER. This is likely due to changes in 
the rules of the occupation pension schemes and the increased participation in terms of hours 
of work. For both men and women, retirement at the statutory retirement age of 65 remains 
quite exceptional. Unemployment and Disability Insurance together make up 30 to 40% of the 
pathways to retirement of the persons retiring in any given year among men and about 20 to 
25% among women. 
 
 
5.  Historical data on activity, participation 
Employed, unemployed, not in the labor force 
 
In this section we present labor force data for three age groups (40-44, 50-54 and 60-64) for 
men  and  women  for  the  period  1981-2007,  on  the  basis  of  the  Income  Panel  Survey  of 
Statistics Netherlands (see section 4). Figures 14 and 15 present employment rates, figures 16 
and 17 unemployment rates, and figures 18 and 19 present the complement of employment 
and unemployment: not in the labor force.  
 
< Figures 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 about here >  
 
                                                 
2 In fact, recipients of a state pension (65+) are entitled to a supplement if they have a younger spouse without 
income.   9
For men, we once again note the steep decline of the employment rate in the older age group 
(60-64), from almost 60% in 1981 to less than 25% in 1994, picking up to more than 40% in 
2007. Unemployment peaked at less than 15% in this age group in the 1990s, so for the most 
part the decline and subsequent increase in employment was complemented by a considerable 
increase in the percentage of men not in the labor force, peaking at more than 60% in 1994 
and showing a clear decrease to less than 50% in 2007. The other two age groups show much 
less variation, with employment hovering close to 90% in the youngest age group and slightly 
lower in the age group 50-54. 
 
For  women,  the  employment  rates  show  clear  cohort  effects:  employment  starts  its 
spectacular increase during the 1980s in the younger age groups, followed with some delay, 
and at a much lower level, by the oldest age group. Unemployment, starting off at very low 
levels, hovers between 5 and 10% after 1989 in all three age groups. The percentages not in 
the  labor  force  again  mainly  reflect  the  trends  in  the  employment  rates,  by  showing  the 
opposite pattern. 
 
If we separate out the DI recipients from men not in the labor force (figure 20), we note that 
whereas the latter statistic showed a steep increase in the oldest age group between 1981 and 
1994, the number of DI recipients only increased moderately (from about 20 to 23%). On the 
other hand, a large part of the decrease in the number of men not in the labor force after 1994 
in this age group is made up by a decrease in the number of DI recipients. For women the DI 
rates do not show decreasing trends: they more or less appear to reflect the increasing labor 
force participation rates. 
 
< Figures 20 and 21 about here > 
 
Historical data on DI vs. health, mortality 
 
Comparing mortality trends and DI receipt of men aged 40-44 (figure 22) we notice that this 
age group showed an increase in the number of DI recipients between 1981 and 1994, despite 
the slightly decreasing mortality rate. After 1994, the decreasing mortality rate could be seen 
as one of the contributing factors to the decrease in the number of DI recipients. For the 
women in this age group, mortality and DI receipt show a negative correlation (figure 23), if 
any.  
 
< Figures 22 and 23 about here > 
 
In the age group 60-64, the pattern is comparable: for men (figure 24), DI and mortality show 
opposing trends until 1994 but both move downward afterward. For women (figure 25), DI 
and mortality show a negative correlation throughout the whole period. Both for this age 
group and for the age group 40-44, the negative correlation would be the direct result of the 
cohort effects in female labor force participation. Female employment rises steadily during 
the period and DI receipt rises with it. Since at the same time mortality decreases steadily, a 
negative correlation is the result. 
 
< Figures 24 and 25 about here >  
 
For health, we only have a crude measure (the percentage of people with self-reported health 
good or better), for a broad age group (45-64). For men, there is some indication that an   10
improvement of the health measure coincides with a decrease in DI receipt. For women there 
is no clear trend in the health measure, while DI receipt tends to increase slightly.  
 
< Figures 26 and 27 about here >  
 
A final perspective is given by Figure 28 which shows the difference between DI receipt in 
the age groups 60-64 and 40-44, for men and women. Notably, for men this difference is 
much higher than for women throughout the whole period. This probably does not really 
mean  that  disability  prevalence  increases  much  faster  with  age  among  men  than  among 
women. More likely it is caused by the fact that women who left the labor market relying on 
the income of their spouse have no access to DI. The declining difference between men and 
women is indicative of the fact that more and more older women stay on the labor market. 
The fact that the difference between 40-44 year old men and 60-64 year old men decreases at 
the end of the period suggests that the earlier, larger difference between these age groups is 
not really the result of older people having a lower ability to work but is largely caused by the 
fact that it used to be easy to get access to DI for older men who wanted or were forced to 
leave the labor market before the statutory retirement age of 65. 
 
< Figure 28 about here > 
 
In summary, health and mortality do not seem to be strongly related to DI prevalence. At the 
end of the period, the reforms appear to be successful in causing a decrease in DI prevalence. 




6.  An explorative empirical analysis 
The empirical evidence presented in the sections above seems to suggest that DI receipt is 
unrelated  to  the  general  health  of  the  population  and  that  DI  reforms  may  have  led  to 
relatively  fewer  older  workers  exiting  the  labor  market  through  DI.  In  this  section  we 
empirically investigate these issues using  a regression model. Such an approach makes it 
possible to control for cyclical variation in the labor market exit rate and to quantify the 
impacts of health and policy reforms on the various pathways to retirement conditional on age 
and gender. The policy reforms are modeled using year-dummy variables indicating reforms. 
The data are taken from the Income Panel Study of the Netherlands (see section 4). We select 
individuals who are 50-63 year of age and aggregate these data based on year, gender and age 
category  (50-54,  55-59  and  60-63).
3  Over  the  time  period  1989-2006  we  have  108 
observations.  
 
Empirical framework: A simple pathway model 
 
Individuals  can  exit  employment  through  the  pathways  Disability  Insurance  (DI),  early 
retirement, (ER), Unemployment Insurance (UI) or non-participation (NP). With individual 
level data this can be modeled using a competing risk model. We use, however, aggregated 
data to carry out the empirical analysis. This means we do not have individual pathways to 
retirement but proportions of (groups of) people that choose certain pathways. We define 
                                                 
3 We exclude 64 year old persons as most often their employment contract is automatically terminated when they 
reach the statutory retirement age of 65 and they start receiving a state pension.    11
c
agt p as the proportion of employed individuals with age a and gender g that leave employment 
through pathway c in year t. For a logit-type model for each pathway we can specify the 
following linear regression model: 






c cj jt c ag i agt i agt agt c
j agt
p
D X H E
p
α α β β β ε
=
 
= + + + + +     −  
∑ ,     
where  ( ) DI, ER, UI, NP c∈ ,  { } 1989,..,2006 t∈
4, the  jt D ’s are dummy variables indicating 
reforms  (see  table  1),  ag X are  explanatory  variables  (gender  and  age),  agt H is  remaining 
healthy life expectancy
5 and agt E is the total outflow from employment. In the estimation we 
use  the  pathway  non-participation  (NP)  as  the  reference  category.
6  The  error  term 
c
agt ε is 
heteroskedastic and this is taken into account when calculating the standard errors. For details 
on the estimation we refer to Cameron and Trivedi (2005). We use an Instrumental Variables 
estimator to take into account that the total outflow from employment  agt E  may, for instance, 
be  influenced  by  unobserved  variables  also  affecting  a  specific  pathway.
7  The  additional 
instrument is total employment by age, gender and year obtained from OECD statistics. The 
justification for choosing this additional instrument is that the outflow from employment will 
be positively related with total employment since the more people are employed the more 
people are at risk of leaving employment, while we do not expect total employment to affect 






The  first  column  of  Table  2  presents  the  estimation  results  of  a  linear  regression  model 
explaining the (logarithm of) total flow from employment. The remaining columns present 
estimation results for the model discussed above for each of the pathways. The total outflow 
from employment increases with age and is higher among women than men. The total outflow 
appears unrelated to health. The DI reform in 1996 and the reforms in 2006 are significantly 
and  negatively  associated  with  the  outflow  from  employment  but  there  is  no  significant 
association between the other reforms and the outflow from employment.  
 
Conditional  on  the  total  flow  from  employment  and  compared  to  male  workers,  female 
workers are less likely to exit employment through DI, ER and UI and more likely to exit 
employment without own source of replacement income. With age ER becomes relatively 
more important and DI and UI become less important exit routes. In line with our conclusions 
drawn from the various figures in the sections above, we find no significant relationship 
between  healthy  life  expectancy  and  the  pathways  to  retirement.  The  1993  and  2002  DI 
reforms  are  associated  with  a  lower  exit  probability  into  DI  whilst  the  1998  reform  (the 
                                                 
4 Outflow is from t -> t+1. We do not observe the outflow in 1981 and 1985 because the subsequent years are not 
in our data. Hence 1989 is our first year and 2006 is the last year in our “flow” sample. 
5 Remaining healthy life expectancy is defined as the number of years a person of certain age and in a particular 
year is expected to live in good health where good health is defined as absence of chronic disease, absence of 
physical limitations, or perceived good health. 
6 We use the normalization: 
NP DI ER UI 1 agt agt agt agt p p p p = − − − .   
7 Another possible bias may come from measurement error in IPO data. For this reason we use an instrument 
based on OECD data. 
8 We follow Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) and present a test for whether or not the instrument has sufficient 
explanatory power (see table 2).   12
introduction  of  experience  rating)  appears  to  have  affected  the  exit  probability  to  DI 
positively. We have no explanation for this latter finding but the termination of experience 
rating  in  2008  hints  towards  this  indeed  being  an  ineffective  instrument  for  reducing  DI 
inflow. A counterintuitive finding is the positive effect of the 2000 reform on ER and its 
negative impact on DI inflow. This may be the result of workers (and employers) making 
more use of ER in anticipation of further limitations on ER eligibility. In most cases the 
coefficients of the reforms on the estimated probability to exit via unemployment have the 
opposite  sign  as  the  ones  found  for  the  probability  to  exit  to  DI,  suggesting  a  possible 
substitution between these two routes.  
 
< Table 2 about here > 
 
To  obtain  further  insights  into  these  empirical  results,  Table  3  presents  the  predicted 
percentage-changes in the total outflow and the pathway probabilities due to a change in the 
explanatory variables. The total outflow from employment is 36% higher among women than 
men (first row). The outflow from employment more than quadruples for workers age 60-63 
compared to workers age 50-54 and with age workers are increasingly more likely to flow 
into early  retirement than into disability or unemployment (rows 2 and 3). Again, health 
appears  to  have  no  effect  on  the  total  outflow  from  employment  and  the  pathways  to 
retirement (row 4). Total outflow from employment is not significantly associated with the 
outflow from employment into DI but is positively associated with the flow into ER. This 
suggests that when the total outflow from employment is high, for instance, as a result of a 
downturn in the economy, the exit route ER is relatively more frequently used.  
 
Finally, the last row suggests that, cumulatively, the reforms have had substantial effects: they 
have reduced the total outflow from employment with 38% and, moreover, reduced the shares 
of the pathways into DI  and ER with, respectively, 40% and 20%, at the expense of an 
increase in the outflows into UI and nonparticipation (“other”) with, respectively 17% and 
53%. 
 
< Table 3 about here > 
 
 
7.  Conclusion  
The  relatively  generous  and  easily  accessible  DI  benefit  can  be  seen  as  an  important 
institution contributing to the large numbers of workers retiring from the labor market at 
relatively early ages in the Netherlands. There are no indications that the high numbers of DI 
are related to high mortality rates or high percentages of persons living in bad health.  
 
By a continuous series of reforms, the government has attempted to reverse the trend of ever 
expanding numbers of DI recipients. Until recently, these reforms did not result in much of a 
decrease in the number of DI recipients. Despite the reforms, DI remained attractive and 
accessible. However, it is likely that without reforms, the number of DI recipients would have 
kept on increasing much further. The empirical analysis shows that several reforms to the DI, 
ER, and UI programs are related to the pathways to retirement. Notably, these reforms are 
found to be associated with reductions in the labor market exit rate of older workers and the 
percentage inflow into DI and ER. This has, arguably, contributed to the observed increased 
labor force participation rate among the 55-64 population from the mid-1990s onwards. 
   13
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Figure 3 
















































Female employment rate by age group



































Pathways to retirement, women 50-64
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Female unemployment rate by age group






























Female NLF by age group










































Female disability rate by age group
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Figure 28 
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Table 1: Timeline reforms to Disability Insurance (DI), State Pension (SP), Early 
Retirement (ER), Occupational Pension (PP) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) 
  DI / (long-term) Sickness Insurance  SP, ER, PP, UI  
1967  Introduction of DI (WAO) 
(20,000 beneficiaries expected) 
 
1974    SP: Benefit raised and linked to net minimum 
wage 
1975-82    ER: Gradual introduction by 
sector/firm/department; 
ER: 1980 ER contribution tax deductible 
1985  764,000 beneficiaries, replacement rate 
reduced from 80 to 70% 
UI: Replacement rate reduced to 70% 
SP: Married women get independent claim  
1987  No more (full) DI for (partially) 
unemployed 
UI: Changes in eligibility and benefit period  
Earnings related benefit followed by 
continuation benefit 
SP: Distinction between married and cohabiting 
couples abolished 
SP: Introduction single parent allowance 
1988    SP: Earnings tested supplement when partner is 
younger than 65 
1991    UI: Eligibility revised 
1993  (i) Persons younger than 50 receive DI for 
a limited period  
(ii) Stricter disability criteria.  
(iii) Retesting of younger DI recipients  
 
1994  Introducing employer paid periods of 
sickness (2-6 weeks) 
SP: Earnings tested supplement adapted 
1995    UI: Eligibility revised, introduction short term 
benefit 
1996  (i) Sickness benefit privatised: employer 
pays 70% of earnings (1 yr) 
(ii) Exemptions for earnings tested 
supplement abolished 
 
1998  (i) Introduction of (limited) experience 
rating DI contributions employer. 
(ii) Public employees included in DI 
 
2000-05    ER/PP: Trend towards actuarially fairer flexible 
ER age 
2001    UI: Public employees included 
2002  Stricter reintegration rules in case of 
sickness 
 
2003  Experience rating for small employers 
abolished 
UI: Abolition of continuation benefit 
2004  (i) Sickness benefit period extended to 2 
years  
(ii) Strict reevaluation DI recipients 
younger than 50 
 
2006  Introduction of new DI: strict distinction 
between partially and fully, permanently 
disabled 
ER: Fiscal friendly treatment of ER contributions 
repealed; (Introduction of life course saving) 
UI: benefit period shortened, higher benefit first 
two months 
2008  Experience rating DI abolished   
Main Source: Kroniek van de sociale verzekeringen 2008, www.uwv.nl 
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ln(P(pathway c)/(1-P(pathway c))) 
  
  
   
Disability 
Insurance  Early retirement 
Unemployment 
Insurance 
Explanatory variable  b/t  b/t  b/t  b/t 
Intercept  0.279**  -0.745**  -1.683**  -0.792** 
  (3.54)  (-4.20)  (-13.36)  (-3.30) 
Woman  0.307**  -0.688**  -0.468**  -0.477** 
  (2.38)  (-5.48)  (-4.26)  (-3.11) 
Age 55-59 
a  0.745**  -0.568**  1.398**  -0.496* 
  (3.38)  (-2.13)  (8.39)  (-1.73) 
Age 60-63 
a  1.493**  -1.078  3.021**  -2.163** 
  (2.56)  (-1.55)  (7.01)  (-2.52) 
ln(healthy life expectancy)  -0.47  1.25  0.892  -0.732 
  (-0.54)  (0.68)  (0.81)  (-0.29) 
1993, Stricter DI criteria  0.055  -0.433**  -0.317**  0.637** 
  (0.58)  (-2.58)  (-2.72)  (3.75) 
1996, DI,1 year sickness benefits  -0.241**  0.234  0.091  -0.364** 
  (-2.52)  (1.54)  (0.77)  (-2.75) 
1998, Experience rating employer  0.112  0.386**  -0.285**  -0.652* 
  (1.13)  (2.80)  (-2.11)  (-1.75) 
2000, ER actuarially fairer  -0.073  -0.297**  0.231*  0.22 
  (-0.68)  (-2.36)  -1.8  -1.06 
2002, DI, gatekeeper improvement  -0.056  -0.345**  -0.008  0.256 
  (-0.64)  (-2.44)  (-0.07)  (1.53) 
2004, DI,2 years sickness benefits  0.022  0.031  -0.083  0.089 
  (0.27)  (0.20)  (-0.71)  (0.50) 
2006, new DI (WIA), ER/UI changes  -0.292*  -0.259  0.114  0.051 
  (-1.70)  (-1.50)  (0.85)  (0.32) 
Ln(level of employment) 
b  0.896**       
  (4.62)       
Ln(total outflow from employment)    0.221  0.769**  -0.003 
    (0.63)  (2.28)  (-0.00) 
Exogeneity test (p-value) 
c     0.049**  0.779  0.573 
Test for the explanatory power of the 
additional instrument (p-value) 
d  0.000**       
R-squared  0.656  0.755  0.945  0.76 
Number of observations  108  108  108  108 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05         
a) Reference age 50-54. The age dummies are jointly significant (p-value F-test is 0.001)   
b) OECD statistics, by age and gender.          
c) H0: total outflow from employment is exogenous.       
d) The null-hypothesis is that the additional instrument Ln(level of employment) has no explanatory power. 
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Table 3: Predicted changes in the pathway probabilities 
            Pathway                      
  
Total outflow from 
employment     
Disability 







  %      %    %    %    %   
Probability of outflow for the reference group 
a)  3.46      32.84    15.23    31.29    20.64   
                       
Cells: Predicted changes   prediction  t-value    prediction t-value  prediction  t-value prediction t-value prediction t-value 
   %-change        %-change     %-change     %-change    %-change   
Women relative to men  35.91  2.05   -40.17  -6.72  -33.49  -5.27  -29.60  -3.50  133.54  5.25 
Age 55-59, relative to age 50-54  110.69  2.38   -34.16  -2.53  173.84  5.96  -30.64  -2.05  -27.47  -0.13 
Age 60-63, relative to age 50-54  345.17  1.33   -56.81  -2.25  405.39  5.43  -84.11  -6.88  -81.22  -0.90 
A 10% increase in healthy life expectancy  -4.60  -0.55   8.66  0.65  7.76  0.78  -4.96  -0.30  -11.98  0.79 
A 10% increase in the flow out of employment        1.51  0.62  6.66  2.14  -0.02  0.00  -7.28  -3.10 
The cumulative effect of the reforms 
b)  -37.70  -2.33    -39.97  -2.61  -19.87  -1.12  16.92  0.50  52.63  1.54 
a) Men aged 50-54 in 1989                       
b) The reforms listed in table 1 and included in the analysis (table 2).                      
 
 